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Abstract
The Arctic Council has been criticized for its lack of legal status and, consequently, the supposedly
low level of implementation among member states. Studying Norwegian implementation of six Arctic
Council recommendations, this article challenges that view. I start by assuming that international
law is not binary, that soft law is not a uniform phenomenon, and that soft law recommendations
may entail certain characteristics*precision, monitoring, and stakeholder involvement*that can
enhance their implementation nationally. Additionally, malignancy*an important barrier to national
implementation*is taken into account. The Norwegian authorities have implemented several of the
recommendations studied, and the characteristics are found to have a bearing on the outcomes.
However, the absence of malignancy stands out as the most significant condition for achieving
national implementation.
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1 Introduction
During recent debates on the Arctic Council, scholars have highlighted the Council’s
putative weakness as a soft law body, and generally questioned its effectiveness.1
This criticism is largely rooted in a lack of legal bindingness: the Arctic Council
does not hold the power to contract or enforce legally binding agreements, nor to
apply sanctions against its member states. Its recommendations are only politically
binding, whereas domestic follow-up is voluntary. Accordingly, it has been claimed
that few incentives for national implementation exist.
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However, only a few studies have examined how the Council’s recommendations
actually affect national processes,2 or*more broadly*the positive effects of soft law on
national implementation. This article explores the extent to which the Norwegian autho-
rities have implemented recommendations from two of the Council’s foremost policy
contributions: the 2004 Arctic Climate Impact Assessment (ACIA), which put climate-
change adaptation on the global agenda; and the 2009 Arctic Marine Shipping Assessment
(AMSA), the first and only report to cover shipping throughout the Arctic region.3
I start by assuming that international law is not binary, that soft law is not a uniform
phenomenon, and that soft law recommendations may entail certain characteristics
that enhance their domestic implementation. In particular, I ask how precision,
procedures for monitoring state behavior and the involvement of stakeholders
in norm development can act as drivers of national implementation. In addition,
malignancy*an important barrier to national implementation4 *is taken into
account. Data from interviews and documents indicate that these first three
characteristics are relevant to Norwegian implementation, i.e. translating recommen-
dations into action at the national level. However, the absence of malignancy appears
to be the most significant condition for achieving implementation.
In the following, I start by clarifying the concept of implementation, and
then present my fundamental arguments and how the selected characteristics are
expected to affect national implementation. Subsequently, I examine whether the
recommendations*three derived from the ACIA and three from the AMSA5*have
been implemented, and how their characteristics, as well as malignancy, alone and in
interaction, have affected varying outcomes.
2 What does national implementation entail?
International commitments usually require behavioral change at the domestic
(national) level. National implementation concerns the steps taken to induce those
changes.6 In accordance with this understanding, national implementation is
commonly defined as the process whereby international commitments are translated
into action at the domestic level, attempting to steer actors towards specific behaviors.7
The definition applied in this article rests on the same principles. Specifically, I take
national implementation to include domestically conducted programs or actions in
response to soft-law recommendations of the Arctic Council. Indicators of such
programs or actions are administrative measures and/or budget allocations. Further,
national programs and actions may be initiated in order to influence other states’
policies through international organizations and institutions. According to the defi-
nition applied here, in order to be considered as national implementation, such chains
of events must result from the recommendation in question, and induce certain
changes at the national level, before ‘‘bouncing’’ back to the international one. At the
international level, this should result in Norwegian initiatives and/or projects being
carried out within the relevant organization.
This concept of implementation is closely linked to causality, implying that outputs
(in this case, Arctic Council recommendations) affect the behavior of relevant
actors, and that it is possible to trace causal mechanisms to show an actual link
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between them. Precisely because of its inherent causality, I have chosen to focus on
implementation*not compliance, as commonly studied within the academic literature.
Compliance, as opposed to implementation, concerns whether the behavior of states
and their actors conforms to international provisions. Compliance may even be
accidental, resulting from laws and regulations already initiated, whereas implemen-
tation is by definition instrumental in nature.8
Of course, the determination of causation is a highly complex issue, and the reader
must be aware that only a part of the greater picture is presented here. Still, I believe
that focusing on causation lowers the risk of ascribing too much credit to the Arctic
Council and is therefore a useful exercise. Now, before moving on to the analysis, a
closer look at the phenomenon of international law, and especially soft law, is in order.
3 The dynamics of international law: Different forms of soft law?
International law has traditionally been considered a binary phenomenon.9 Hard law
is understood as obligations that are legally binding, whereas soft law refers to norms
that are deliberately non-binding in character, located ‘‘in the twilight between law
and politics.’’10 When the two are pitted against each other, the former is often favored
over the latter. Scholars within strands of legal positivism, for instance, privilege
hard law: They consider the legal obligation to be crucial*the one element that
distinguishes law from mere norms. By definition, then, ‘‘law’’ becomes binding, and
the very concept of ‘‘soft law’’ is rejected.11 In line with this view, conventional wisdom
holds that the most effective commitments are those which are legally binding.
Recent years have witnessed an upsurge in studies of international law and its
effects on state behavior. Through contemporary debates, new perspectives have
appeared that challenge the ‘‘binary divide’’. Among the key opponents of the binary
view, Abbott and Snidal hold that the hard law/soft law distinction is incorrectly taken
as dichotomous.12 Instead, international law should be understood as dynamic and a
matter of gradation. They portray the broader phenomenon of international law as
consisting of three dimensions: obligation*that states or other actors are bound by a
rule or commitment, making their behavior subject to scrutiny under international
law; precision*that rules unambiguously define the conduct that is required,
authorized, or prescribed; and delegation*that third parties are granted authority
to implement, interpret, and apply the rules.13 According to this understanding, hard
law refers to ‘‘legally binding agreements that are precise (. . .) and that delegate
authority for interpreting and implementing the law.’’14 The realm of soft law, then,
begins once legal arrangements are weakened along these dimensions.
Abbott and Snidal’s claims have been both applauded and criticized, but one
particularly important lesson can be drawn from their work: Softening may occur in
varying degrees, which in turn will have distinct implications for how soft-law
agreements are interpreted and implemented.15 Hence, soft law is neither fixed nor
uniform: it exists in differing forms (as is also the case with hard law). By extension,
I argue that the characteristics of a certain soft-law commitment*here I focus on
precision, monitoring of state behavior, and stakeholder involvement*can affect
national decisions about implementing it.
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3.1 Characteristics of the commitment as drivers of national implementation
The characteristics a commitment holds has not been particularly central to soft-law
studies, but is of great relevance to studies of hard law: The three characteristics
included in this study  precision, monitoring and stakeholder involvement  have
been strongly associated with such agreements, and their presence is considered
highly important for national implementation.16 In conducting the analysis later in
this article, I thus understand them, in line with those earlier works, as involving the
following:
Precision refers to ‘‘rules that unambiguously establish the conduct they require,
authorize, or prescribe.’’17 A precise recommendation should specify what is
expected*stating the objective and the necessary measures to achieve it.18 Precision
is important for impact because it reduces the leeway available to states and actors
with regard to interpretation and discretion. Hence, domestic implementation is best
facilitated by a clear message with minimal possibility for misinterpretation.19 In
contrast, general rules have several drawbacks. Most importantly, they render
meaningful assessment of implementation difficult, as much less work is demanded
on the part of states expected to abide by them.
Monitoring of state behavior concerns the obligations of states to report back on
national measures to meet a certain recommendation.20 Such mechanisms make
parties more accountable, particularly if any failure to fulfill obligations is publicly
revealed.21 Where some sort of monitoring exists, states will usually seek to avoid
potential shaming. Monitoring also serves to keep the issue on the national and
international agendas. The presence or absence of progress may entail scrutiny at
both levels, also enabling NGOs and other actors to challenge governmental
positions and exert pressure.22
Stakeholder involvement concerns ‘‘those actors who are affected by the institution or
who are capable of influencing its performance’’ and, further, who are invited to
participate in norm-development processes.23 Such involvement is held to be positive,
not least because stakeholders may seek to persuade their national decision-makers to
implement the norms that they themselves helped create. They therefore contribute
to the internalization of international norms, by linking them to domestic policies.
Or, stakeholders involved in international norm- development processes*persons/
organizations knowledgeable about the matter in question*may be invited into
subsequent domestic processes by the national authorities. Then, there may also be
room to influence relevant decision-makers at the national level.
These three characteristics have been well studied in the academic literature, which
lends leverage to expectations of their effect on national implementation. Importantly,
the three characteristics are particularly relevant in the context of the Arctic Council.
Since the ACIA project and especially after 2009, with the release of the ‘second-
generation’ AMSA report, the Council has formulated increasingly specific policy
recommendations and follow-up actions.24 Moreover, after the 2009 AMSA release,
one of the most articulated criticisms regarding the Council’s effectiveness*the lack
of a formal monitoring mechanism*was challenged.
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Current trends within the Council also seem to have a bearing on the composition
and involvement of various stakeholders. Through the permanent participants,
indigenous peoples’ groups play an important role in the policy work of the
Council,25 although they are sometimes marginalized due to lack of resources.
Council observers, by contrast, have much more limited rights.26 Additionally, given
the Council’s expanding agenda, this group cannot be expected to include all
relevant stakeholders. Whether other stakeholders have the opportunity to inform
policy processes will vary, and is likely to depend on more informal ways of inclusion.
Thus, based on these contextual settings, the question: When present, what
bearing do the three above-noted characteristics have on national implementation?
3.2 Malignancy as an obstacle to national implementation
But first, one final point on malignancy and its negative effect on national im-
plementation. Essentially, ‘‘malignancy’’ concerns the complex political nature of a
given problem and, consequently, the incentive to avoid following commitments.27 In
terms of national implementation one may thus ask: What accounts for such an incentive?
Here, I make use of two explanatory dimensionspolitical costs and economic costs.
‘‘Political costs’’ refers to the divergent preferences among relevant actors that
may obstruct implementation. However, within Norwegian High North politics,
congruity between the parties in the parliament has become the norm. This is
illustrated, inter alia, by the White Paper ‘‘Opportunities and Challenges in the High
North’’, which sought to develop a new and comprehensive policy for the area’s rich
resources, and the firm support accorded to this policy by the Norwegian Parliament.
The same held true when the Government presented ‘‘Nordkloden’’ (‘‘Norway’s
arctic policy’’) in 2014. As such, opposition or ‘‘divergent preferences’’ tend to stem
from groupings outside the political sphere. ‘‘Economic costs’’, on the other hand,
refers to the strain that implementation places on financial resources. Here, a rule of
thumb is that economic costs exceed potential gains from implementation.
Put briefly, then, and in simple terms: Recommendations that do not invoke
political or economic costs are non-malignant; while recommendations that in-
voke political and/or economic costs are malignant, thus considerably lowering the
likelihood of implementation.
4 Implementing the Arctic Climate Impact Assessment
When it was presented in 2004, the Arctic Climate Impact Assessment (ACIA)
represented a milestone in the Council’s history. As the first regional climate change
assessment, the ACIA dramatically challenged the global understanding of the Arctic
as a ‘‘frozen desert,’’ and shed light on the vast and complex transformations
underway in the region.28 To combat the ongoing climate changes revealed through
the ACIA project, recommendations based on two sets of actions were put forth:
mitigation, to reduce greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions; and adaptation, to limit the
adverse impacts of climate change by developing greater resilience.29
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4.1 National context and selected recommendations
At the beginning of the ACIA project in 2000, mitigation already featured on
national and international agendas. Through global regimes like UNFCCC, and the
Kyoto Protocol in particular, Norway was legally committed to reducing its GHG
emissions. Therefore, any change in state behavior concerning mitigation must be
viewed within the established context of these frameworks, not the Arctic Council.30
However, serious discussion on adaptation had yet to emerge*in fact, adaptation
was viewed by some as a highly problematic measure that would compromise efforts
to reduce emissions.31 Yet, a shift in priorities within the climate regime and the
media discourse can be traced, drawing largely on the new knowledge produced by
the ACIA.32 The ACIA revealed how climate change had already caused severe
problems for ecosystems and human communities in the Arctic. Moreover, it
recognized that climate change had become inevitable, making adaptation vital. With
its unique focus on the Arctic region, the ACIA succeeded in putting adaptation on
the global agenda*as well as on the national agenda of Norway.
The first Norwegian White Paper on climate change, released in 1995, focused on
GHG emissions, accompanied by mitigation measures aimed at reducing them.33 It
was only after a new White Paper came in 2001 that adaptation gained momentum.34
With regard to the Arctic, adaptation was viewed in the context of the ongoing ACIA
process, where Norway occupied a central role. That same year, the Norwegian
Ministry of the Environment established a steering committee responsible for the
country’s ACIA work. In the course of 2001 and 2002, four meetings were held on
climate change and its consequences for the Norwegian North. The conclusions of
these meetings were forwarded to the international process and the Norwegian state
authorities.35As Arctic climate adaptation had received limited attention until the
turn of the century, it may be that the ACIA, even before it was finalized, made the
topic more central in Norwegian politics. Hence, the focus on adaptation and national
measures to implement the following ACIA recommendations:
Table 1. The ACIA recommendations
Help Arctic Residents Adapt: Work closely with Arctic residents, including indigenous and local
communities, to help them to adapt and manage the environmental, economic and social impacts of
climate change and ultraviolet radiation change. Adaptation needs will vary. Arctic residents may need
inter alia enhanced access to information, decision-makers, and institutional capacity building to
safeguard their health, culture and well-being.
Adaptive Management, Nature Conservation, and Reduction of Risks: Implement as appropriate,
adaptive management strategies for Arctic ecosystems, making use of local and indigenous knowledge
and participation, review nature conservation and land and resource use policies and programs, and to the
extent possible reduce risks related to infrastructure damage, permafrost degradation, floods and costal
erosion, taking into account costs and benefits.
Develop the Arctic in a Sustainable Manner: Recognize that opportunities related to climate change, such
as increased navigability of sea routes and access to resources, should be developed and managed in a
sustainable manner, including through the consideration of environmental and social impacts and taking
appropriate measures to protect the environment, local residents and communities.
Source: Arctic Council, ACIA Policy Document (2004)
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4.2 National implementation
Recommendation: Help Arctic residents adapt
The first recommendation, ‘‘help Arctic residents adapt,’’ focused on the need for
adaptation in the North through better access to information, decision-makers, and
institutional capacity for those living in the Arctic.36 Of the various Norwegian
initiatives related to this recommendation, one national program* NorACIA*
stands out as an important implementation measure. NorACIA was introduced in
2005, with responsibility for domestic follow-up of ACIA.37 Its mandate was to
generate and disseminate knowledge, and to provide the Ministry of the Environment
with advice concerning relevant national processes.38 Thus, a central information
platform was created for Arctic residents and for decision-makers. Several seminars
focused on the consequences of climate change related to infrastructure, shipping,
Saami industries and societal aspects.39 Involved in these meetings were actors from
research communities, Saami institutions, and the government administration*at
both the national and regional levels.40 Yet, the most striking feature of Norwegian
implementation measures during this period was the focus on indigenous peoples in
the design of adaptation policies. For instance, the 2006 High North Strategy stated:
‘‘The Arctic Climate Impact Assessment (ACIA) documents how indigenous peoples
have adapted to earlier climate change’’ and that ‘‘the climate change currently taking
place may have major impacts on the way of life of indigenous peoples (. . .)’’.41
The indigenous dimension of the High North Strategy was further elaborated in the
2007 White Paper, Norwegian Saami Policy, where indigenous knowledge and
observation of climate-change adaptation were mentioned as central to following
up the ACIA.42
How can we explain this positive outcome? In the following discussion (and in the
discussion of the other ACIA recommendations), I omit the characteristic of
‘‘monitoring,’’ as a reporting system was not established for the ACIA. The focus
is therefore on precision, stakeholder involvement and potentially the malignant nature
of the issue.
First of all, we see that the recommendation is precise. It states the objective*‘‘to
help Arctic residents adapt’’, with possible measures for achieving this*‘‘enhance
access to information, decision-makers, and institutional capacity building’’. As
precision is thought to reduce states’ use of interpretation and discretion, it may well
be that these aspects helped identify the necessary measures to be taken.
Regarding malignancy, the recommendation does not entail significant political
cost. There was already widespread agreement in Norway on the importance of the
ACIA and its findings. Moreover, access to information and decision-makers are not
measures that require great financial resources. The absence of malignancy may thus
have facilitated follow-up actions.
Thirdly, the Arctic Council processes in which the recommendation was developed
had involved stakeholders. Particularly indigenous peoples’ groups, as permanent
participants, were involved in all aspects of the ACIA process, including policy work.43
From the start, the focus was therefore directed towards the human dimension of
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climate change, framed largely as the impacts of climate change on indigenous
peoples, their lives and livelihoods.44 In the implementation of this specific
recommendation, the Saami Council, a permanent participant representing the
Saami population, played a role at the national level. Together with the other
permanent participants, the Saami Council issued statements urging national
governments to act.45 Moreover, during initial NorACIA meetings, Saami Council
representatives stressed the need for the participation and inclusion of Saami
interests.46 The Saami Council, thereby, affected the national process by lobbying
the national authorities and identifying potential representatives and experts from
Saami communities.47 Similarly, environmental organizations were included as
stakeholders in the Arctic Council norm-development processes. The WWF
participated in several ACIA meetings at the international level and, subsequently
in certain lobbying activities nationally. Shortly after the release of the ACIA report, a
letter was sent to the Norwegian Minister of Foreign Affairs, encouraging national
decision-makers to develop and implement adaptation strategies.48 Later, the WWF
received funding from NorACIA for a factsheet series on the impacts of climate
change. Thus, we see that the WWF was also involved in implementing the
recommendation. In total, whereas the exact effect of precision is difficult to determine,
both stakeholder involvement and the absence of malignancy would appear to have had
positive impacts on implementation.
Recommendation: Adaptive management, nature conservation and reduction of risks
The second ACIA recommendation, ‘‘adaptive management, nature conservation,
and reduction of risks,’’ involved the following objectives: implementation of
adaptive management strategies in cooperation with indigenous peoples; review of
nature conservation and land use policies and programs; and reduction of risks
related to infrastructure damage, permafrost degradation, floods and coastal
erosion.49 National measures were also implemented in this case, but principally
under NorACIA. As regards nature conservation and the review of such policies, an
evaluation of key habitats in Northern Norway and on Svalbard was conducted in
2009, assessing whether current conservation practices were sufficient, or whether
greater efforts were necessary to safeguard biodiversity.50 These assessment reports
have continued to provide an important framework for the management of protected
areas on Svalbard.51 In addition, several reports on infrastructure damage, as well as
the vulnerability of Norway’s northern counties and municipalities to floods and
coastal erosion were prepared under the umbrella of NorACIA.52
What then can be said of the effects of the three chosen characteristics, plus
malignancy, on the outcomes? As the recommendation merely states the objectives of
adaptive management, nature conservation and risk reduction, without specifying
any measures for achieving them, it is imprecise. However, this imprecision need not
have a negative bearing on national implementation*indeed, the vague formulation
may have made implementation less challenging.
The positive effect that imprecision may have on implementation is closely linked
to the concept of malignancy. By being imprecise, the recommendation does not
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impose economic costs; likewise, formulations like ‘‘review’’ and ‘‘reduction of risks’’
do not invite significant political disagreement. Therefore, it is possible that the lack
of precision served to reduce malignancy, in turn easing the implementation process.
Stakeholder involvement, on the other hand, seems to have had a limited effect on
the positive implementation outcome here. Although the Saami Council and the
WWF were actively involved in Arctic Council processes, we find no indication of
their involvement in subsequent national processes. One explanation, especially
regarding the Saami Council, may be that the assessment reports were scientific in
nature and prepared exclusively by specialists.
Briefly, then: the imprecision of this recommendation seems to have had a positive
bearing on the implementation outcome, by lowering the political and economic
costs, and thereby malignancy. As previously mentioned, however, the exact effect of
precision is difficult to measure, and its absence may also be interpreted as a watering
down of the recommendation, requiring less work on part of national authorities, and
thereby making implementation much less demanding. Lastly, we find nothing to
indicate that stakeholder involvement affected the outcome.
Recommendation: Develop the Arctic in a sustainable manner
The third recommendation, ‘‘develop the Arctic in a sustainable manner,’’ encour-
aged member states to develop the Arctic sustainably*particularly in relation to the
increased navigability of sea routes and access to resources*by protecting the
environment, local residents and communities.53 However, it did not result in any
additional implementation measures nationally. To some extent, this can be explained
by previously initiated measures that were consistent with the recommendation, in
particular the Management Plan for the Barents Sea and Lofoten Area. Still, that plan
came to exclude the human dimension of ecosystem-based management*an
important deviation from what was stated in the recommendation.54 By extension,
the interests of the coastal Saami, who are heavily dependent on productive marine
ecosystems and their resources, were not taken into account. This is an important
point, as it indicates that further action could have been taken in order to
accommodate the recommendation. Why then was nothing done?
Firstly, the recommendation is imprecise. It only states objectives*not measures
for achieving them. Of course, when it comes to precision, or lack thereof, the
findings have already proven ambiguous, and it is therefore difficult to determine
any specific effect. With regard to malignancy, however, we see a more distinct
pattern. Although the recommendation would have entailed few specific economic
costs, resource exploitation does involve conflicting interests, especially among
industrial and environmental groups. In the Arctic, indigenous peoples add a further
dimension. Political costs are thus present and, subsequently a certain degree of
malignancy.
Regarding stakeholder involvement, the same applies as with the first two re-
commendations. Indigenous peoples as well as environmental organizations
were involved in the Arctic Council norm-development process*but we find no
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trace of their attempting to influence national processes in relation to this
recommendation.
In summary, it is possible that these aspects combined*the lack of precision, the
presence of malignancy, and no indications of stakeholders attempting to affect national
processes*had an obstructive effect on implementation.
Summary
For a long time, Arctic adaptation did not feature on international or national
agendas. Scant attention was paid to the issue in Norway before the ACIA report.
Taking into account this contextual setting and the upsurge in national adaptation
measures from 2005, ACIA appears to have served as a key driver and as an agenda-
setter in Norwegian politics. As for implementation, the Norwegian authorities did
initiate measures related to two ACIA recommendations: ‘‘help Arctic residents
adapt’’ and ‘‘adaptive management, nature conservation, and reduction of risks.’’
However, no additional measures were taken to implement the recommendation
‘‘develop the Arctic in a sustainable manner.’’
The picture is more nuanced when it comes to the impact of the three char-
acteristics chosen for this study, plus malignancy, on implementation outcomes.
No clear-cut implications of precision and its effect on implementation were
identified. In fact, we can note potential positive influences from both precision and
lack of precision: the former, by clarifying necessary measures to fulfill implementa-
tion; the latter, by lessening political and economic costs and, thereby, malignancy. In
contrast, a consistent pattern was detected in connection with malignancy and its
effect on implementation: The presence of malignancy appeared to hinder imple-
mentation, whereas the absence of malignancy facilitated positive implementation
outcomes. As for the stakeholders involved in the Arctic Council processes, they
participated in subsequent national implementation processes only in relation to the
first recommendation, ‘‘help Arctic residents adapt.’’ However, although this was not
evident in connection with the other recommendations, we should not rule out the
possible effects on implementation yet.
5 Implementing the Arctic Marine Shipping Assessment
A main finding of the ACIA report was the opening of the Arctic Ocean and a possible
increase in Arctic marine activity.55 To follow up this finding, the AMSA project was
launched in 2004, aimed at mapping out shipping volumes in the Arctic marine
regions.56 When this work was finalized in 2009, the need for uniform international
standards matching the Arctic conditions and greater coordination between member
states had been identified.57 To meet these challenges, member states were given
recommendations centering around three themes: enhancing Arctic marine safety,
protecting the Arctic peoples and the environment; and building Arctic marine
infrastructure.58
Ida Folkestad Soltvedt
82
5.1 National context and selected recommendations
As a leading maritime nation, Norway had already paid great attention to these
issues, and AMSA can hardly be seen as an agenda-setter at the domestic level. With
close to 110,000 people working in the maritime sector, and with a value creation
equaling 8.4 per cent of Norway’s GDP,59 Norwegian objectives and measures at the
time were in line with the AMSA recommendations, focusing on safety, emergency
preparedness, and environmental protection. In spite of this, the AMSA findings
quickly gained momentum.60 In Arctic shipping, however, Norway was ahead of
other member states. Therefore, promoting Norwegian standards and greater
cooperation within the Arctic Council became an important objective in national
implementation.61 It is these aspects*the promotion of Norwegian standards and
cooperation*that are the focus of the AMSA analysis below. Here we can note a
slight difference: while the ACIA generated national implementation measures aimed
at national actors, Norway’s objectives related to the AMSA recommendations
centered on influencing the policies of other member states.
The three particular AMSA recommendations under scrutiny are included
because member states were specifically requested to initiate appropriate follow-up
measures within their national implementation processes.62,63
5.2 National implementation
Recommendation: Reduce air emissions
‘‘Reduce air emissions’’ requested member states to reduce their current and future
emissions of greenhouse gases (GHGs), nitrogen oxides (NOx), sulfur oxides (SOx),
and particulate matter (PM) from ships.64 However, reduction of ship emissions to
the atmosphere had already been on the Norwegian agenda for quite some time*the
2007 heavy fuel oil (HFO) ban is an illustrative example.65 As regards implementing
the AMSA recommendation, an important national measure appears to be the
promotion of this ban to other member states.
Table 2. The AMSA recommendations
Reduce Air Emissions: That the Arctic states decide to support the development of improved practices and
innovative technologies for ships in port and sea to help reduce current and future emissions of
greenhouse gases (GHGs), nitrogen oxides (NOx), sulfur oxides (SOx) and particulate matter (PM), taking
into account the relevant IMO regulations.
Arctic Marine Traffic System: That the Arctic states should support continued development of a
comprehensive Arctic marine traffic awareness system to improve monitoring and tracking of marine
activity, to enhance data sharing in near real-time, and to augment vessel management service in order to
reduce the risk of incidents, facilitate response and provide awareness of potential user conflict. The Arctic
states should encourage shipping companies to cooperate in the improvement and development of
national monitoring systems.
Survey of Arctic Indigenous Marine Use: That the Arctic states should consider conducting surveys on
Arctic marine use by indigenous communities where gaps are identified, to collect information for
establishing up-to-date baseline data to assess the impacts from Arctic shipping activities.
Source: PAME, Arctic Marine Shipping Assessment Report (2009), pp. 67
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In 2010, the Norwegian Maritime Authority (NMA) was requested to assist the
Norwegian delegation to PAME and the Ministry of the Environment in following up
the AMSA report. The NMA was specifically instructed to participate in PAME’s
workings, and to promote the Norwegian standpoint regarding an early ban on the
use and carriage of HFO in Arctic waters. The final objective was to promote a joint
proposal to the International Maritime Organization.66 The same message was
repeated in subsequent years and appears to have set the stage for a Norwegian
initiative within the Arctic Council:67 Before the end of 2010, the Norwegian
delegation to PAME had proposed a project to compile existing knowledge on the use
and carriage of HFO in the Arctic.68 The project would investigate the consequences
of HFO in terms of potential spills and air pollution, including the formation of black
carbon.69 It resulted in three reports, the final of which was issued in 2013.
Considering the implementation measure just reviewed, how can the character-
istics and malignancy of this AMSA recommendation help explain the outcome?
Firstly, the recommendation is not precise*it does not specify any measures for
achieving the objective of reducing emissions. By allowing for interpretation and
leeway, such lack of precision could be expected to hamper national implementation.
In this case, however, imprecision appears to have worked in favor of Norwegian
preferences. Given the disagreement among member states, specifying a ban on
HFO within the recommendation would have been impossible,70 whereas vagueness
may have facilitated the promotion of a ban regardless of divergent member-state
preferences.
Moreover, the recommendation was non-malignant*at least within the national
context of Norway. An HFO ban, characterized by broad consensus, had already
been established. Norway had also played an important role in the establishment of
such a ban in the Antarctic, 71 which suggests that arriving at the subsequent decision
to promote a similar ban within the Arctic Council was relatively easy.
Concerning stakeholder involvement, the norm-development process within the
Arctic Council was marked by broad participation, including indigenous peoples’
groups through the permanent participants, environmental organizations, and actors
from the industrial sector. Some of these stakeholders also played a role in subsequent
processes initiated by Norway. By evaluating cargo flows, risks and the environ-
mental impacts of shipping, Det Norske Veritas GL (DNV GL)an international
classification bodyhelped define the initial problem of atmospheric emissions
during the AMSA process.72 When the Norwegian HFO project was accepted by
member states in 2010, DNV GL was approached as a consultant and tasked to carry
out the assessment reports.73 This shows how DNV GL, which was involved in the
AMSA process, was accorded a role in Norwegian follow-up activities; thus, DNV GL
may be seen as a contributor in implementing the recommendation.
The WWF was also involved in developing the AMSA recommendations, and
emphasized the need to identify vulnerable areas.74 After the AMSA process, WWF
stressed how HFO could damage sensitive areas within the Arctic.75 Moreover,
WWF directly criticized the Norwegian government for inadequately promoting
such a ban among the Arctic Council member states.76
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Finally, monitoring was influential in terms of implementation, but not in line with
the ‘naming and shaming’ paradigm. Rather, the AMSA reporting system helped
keep the issue on the agendas of Norway and the Arctic Council. By extension, it
became easier to propose solutions on how best to deal with the recommendation.77
In summation: the positive implementation outcome seems to have been facili-
tated by the involvement of stakeholders, the reporting system, and the absence of
malignancy. Moreover, the very imprecision of the recommendation appears to have
had a positive effect on implementation.
Recommendation: Arctic marine traffic system
As with the recommendation discussed above, the recommendation ‘‘Arctic marine
traffic system’’ did not introduce policies that were new to Norway. Although
member states were requested to support the development of an Arctic marine traffic
system, the Norwegian framework was already extensive. In particular, Norway’s use
of AIS and its security measures was superior to the situation in the other Arctic
states.78 Yet, the recommendation does appear to have launched the idea of
developing a common system, where member states could share information and
obtain a more holistic picture of Arctic shipping. In 2013, the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs published a report on the consequences for Norway of increased Arctic
shipping. The report pointed out that data on Arctic ship traffic was not collected
systematically, nor regularly shared among the Arctic states.79 The government was
therefore advised to develop a joint monitoring and warning satellite-based system for
the Arctic Ocean. BarentsWatch*a monitoring and information system placed in the
Arctic*was proposed as one platform for developing such Arctic cooperation.80 In
2014, this advice was presented to the Arctic Council: during a PAME meeting,
Norway offered to provide raw and processed satellite AIS data to the Council.81
That same year, PAME initiated a new project, Arctic Shipping Data Service
(ASDS), aimed at updating Arctic ship traffic data for use in assessments and trend
analysis.82 Norway and the USA were appointed lead countries. Under the ASDS
project, Norway informed the member states of its own political measures, including
extensive presentations of BarentsWatch and Havbase*another system based on AIS
data.83 Norway also presented an update on ship traffic in the high seas areas of the
Central Arctic Ocean, in line with its 2014 proposal.84 Then in 2016, ASDS was
reframed; the USA took charge, with project completion expected in 2017.85
We may now ask: how did the three characteristics of precision, stakeholder
involvement and monitoring, plus malignancy, affect the outcome? This AMSA
recommendation was precise. Its precision, however, did not have any effect on
implementation activities: It specified measures for achieving the objective of a
ship-traffic system, but such measures had already been implemented by Norway.
On the other hand, the absence of malignancy may have helped national imple-
mentation. As Norway had basically fulfilled the recommendation already, there
must have been broad national consensus on the importance of traffic monitoring.
Moreover, the recommendation would entail few additional expenses. Such a
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situation is likely to have eased the role that Norway assumed within the Arctic
Council.
Further, the involvement of stakeholders*indigenous peoples, environmental
organizations and industry*in the AMSA norm-development process does not seem
to have affected the outcomes of national implementation. At least no trace of their
participation in the national processes has been found.
However, monitoring did facilitate national implementation. By 2014, all AMSA
recommendations had gained momentum within the Arctic Council, and the PAME
agenda was governed and structured by the recommendations.86 This made it easier
to provide suggestions on how to implement the recommendation.
In summary, then, the positive implementation outcome of this recommendation
appears only to have been influenced by the reporting system and the absence of
malignancy.
Recommendation: Survey of Arctic indigenous marine use
Unlike the two foregoing AMSA recommendations, the third one, ‘‘survey of Arctic
indigenous marine use’’, did not result in any national implementation measures.
Here it was argued that a survey had been conducted in 2008, when the Coastal
Fishing Committee investigated the rights of the Saami people and Arctic residents
to fish in the coastal areas of Finnmark county.87 This argument, however, is a source
of disagreement. Although the Coastal Fishing Committee concluded that Saami
and other residents had such rights, little was done by the government to ensure
proper follow-up,88 and the Coastal Fishing Committee did not conduct an actual
survey on the Saami’s traditional marine use of the area. Despite the absence of
implementation measures, this case*like the recommendations discussed above*
still shows that our three characteristics and malignancy have explanatory power.
First of all, this third recommendation was not precise: It merely stated the
objective of conducting surveys on Arctic indigenous marine use*without
specifying the measures necessary to achieve it. Imprecise recommendations allow
for leeway and discretion and, therefore, run the risk of not being implemented.
Norwegian authorities apparently took advantage of the recommendation’s
imprecise formulation, using it to justify the Coastal Fishing Committee’s
activities as implementation*thereby obviating the need to initiate other additional
measures.
Moreover, the recommendation touched on a rather sensitive issue: Whereas the
national authorities claimed that a survey had been conducted, the Saami Council*
a permanent participant of the Arctic Council*argued against this. According to the
Saami Council, the lack of additional implementation measures was rooted in the
question of indigenous peoples’ rights*an issue the government was unwilling to
address.89 Although it is difficult to determine the economic costs such a survey
would entail, this disagreement shows that political costs were present. Thus a
certain level of malignancy existed, serving to obstruct the national implementation
process.
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As for stakeholder involvement, the Saami Council contributed actively to the AMSA
project, resulting in recommendations that reflected the views of the Council.90
Moreover, the Saami Council played an active role in promoting this recom-
mendation to the national authorities. When attempts to persuade national
decision-makers failed, the Saami Council pursued an alternative direction. Together
with the Aleut International Association (AIA),91the report ‘Development of an
Arctic Marine Use Survey Process’ was submitted to PAME.92 The report was
intended as a study on which later measures could be based and as a way of
approaching the topic without inflicting a disfavorable politically situation on
Norway.93 However, due to lack of resources, the Saami Council was unable to
continue participating in the project.94 All the same, the course of events shows how
stakeholders involved in Arctic Council processes may attempt to influence national
implementation processes.
As regards the implementation measures pursued by the Saami Council,
monitoring*the reporting system*was important. The recommendation was
already part of the PAME agenda and was therefore difficult to overlook.95
Thus, we find that both stakeholder involvement and monitoring were of importance
in this case, even though implementation did not come about. Both the imprecision of
the recommendation and its malignancy are likely to have hindered such implemen-
tation processes in unfolding nationally.
Summary
Due to its position as a leading maritime power, Norway had already implemented
much of what AMSA came to recommend, before the report was released. However,
the shipping sector is international in scope, and how other Arctic states operate
affects Norwegian industry, climate and environment. Norway therefore followed up
the AMSA recommendations by promoting its own national standards and greater
member-state cooperation. The recommendations ‘‘reduce air emissions’’ and
‘‘Arctic marine traffic system’’ were implemented, whereas ‘‘survey of Arctic
indigenous marine use’’ did not result in any such measures.
As for the characteristics and malignancy of the AMSA recommendations,
precision did not have any conclusive effect on implementation outcomes. Because
Norway had already fulfilled most of the requirements, any clarification of measures
to be taken had little significance. In fact, the absence of precision may have had
a positive impact on the implementation of the recommendation ‘‘reduce air
emissions’’: since the recommendation was formulated in a way that provided leeway,
Norway was able to pursue a solution that was not part of the recommendation*
despite divergent member-state preferences. The effect of malignancy, on the other
hand, was consistent across the recommendations. When present, malignancy had a
hampering effect on implementation, whereas absence of malignancy favored positive
implementation outcomes. In addition, stakeholder involvement emerged as im-
portant in connection with the recommendations ‘‘reduce air emissions’’ and ‘‘survey
of Arctic indigenous marine use.’’ Finally, we note the importance of monitoring,
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which served as an agenda-setter both within the Arctic Council and at the
national level.
6 Conclusions and implications
Starting from the assumptions that international law is not binary, that soft law is not
a uniform phenomenon, and that certain characteristics of the recommendations*
precision, monitoring and stakeholder involvement*may enhance implementation,
what conclusions can be drawn?
First and foremost, Norway as a member state of the Arctic Council devoted
considerable effort to implementing several of the Council’s recommendations.
Implementation, however, was pursued in two very distinct ways. The ACIA put
adaptation on the national agenda, while the AMSA came into play in a different
domestic context. Consequently, the ACIA process led to national measures con-
ducted within national borders and directed at national actors. As to the AMSA
process, Norway constituted a maritime power and had already implemented most of
the measures proposed in the AMSA’s recommendations. Therefore, an important
implementation objective for Norway became the promotion of national standards
and greater cooperation within the Arctic Council.
Of the six recommendations examined here, four*two from ACIA, and two from
AMSA*generated implementation measures in Norway. This study indicates that
three specific characteristics of the recommendations, along with the presence or
absence of malignancy, did influence some of the outcomes. Although the effects of
precision proved ambiguous, both monitoring of state behavior and stakeholder
involvement appear to have affected implementation positively*if the issues were
non-malignant. When malignancy was present, there was no implementation.
While these findings are interesting in their own right, they also speak to the debate
on the effectiveness of the Arctic Council and to the scholarly literature on
effectiveness more generally. In contrast to assumptions that the Arctic Council, as
a soft-law body, cannot be effective, this study has shown how recommendations from
two significant reports were implemented in Norway. Although other aspects are also
relevant, the structural and organizational characteristics of the Arctic Council’s
recommendations emerge as important explanatory factors, as long as the issue is not
overly demanding. With regard to the literature on effectiveness more generally, this
study has shown that characteristics often associated with hard-law agreements may
be equally relevant in the application of soft-law commitments. Ultimately, then, the
differences between the two may not be as great as often claimed. By extension, it is
not necessarily so that hard law is more effective for ensuring implementation than
soft law.
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